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In  this  paper,  we  investigate  the  gender  wage  differentials  for  Switzerland. 
Using micro data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey, we apply a matching 
method to decompose the wage gap in Switzerland. Compared to the traditional 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, this nonparametric technique does not require 
any estimation of wage equations and accounts for wage differences that can be 
due to differences in the support. Our estimation results show that the problem 
of gender differences in the supports matter in explaining wage differentials. 
We  can  interpret  these  differences  as  a  form  of  “discrimination”  which  is 
reflected in wages because women face “barriers to the entry” in accessing 
certain  individual  characteristics  that  men  achieve.  As  a  consequence, 
accounting for these differences in gender supports may be useful in terms of 
policy implications in promoting more equality between men and women. 
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1  Introduction     
 
 
In Switzerland, the issue of inequality between women and men has been of policy 
concern during the last decades. Both progress and stagnation are the special features in terms 
of gender equality over the period 1970-2000. Some progress has been done in the access to 
education (see OFS, 2003). Despite this gain, it is important to point that some significant 
differences remain especially in areas involving the repartition of domestic and work tasks. In 
Switzerland, the gender specialisation in different areas of life is a strong social norm (see 
OFS, 2003). Along with occupational segregation, this can be a source of wage inequalities 
between men and women.
1 Our concern in this paper is to investigate one particular aspect of 
gender inequalities which is based on wage differentials between men and women. 
 
In the international literature, a growing attention has been paid to this question of 
gender  wage  differentials.  The  way  of  addressing  this  issue  has  typically  involved  the 
distinction between the wage differences that can be due to different compositions of personal 
characteristics  (such  as  age  and  education)  and  the  wage  differences  that  remain  after 




One way for adjusting these observed differences between men and women involves 
wage  regressions.  Although  commonly  used,  this  approach  has  some  limitations.  First,  a 
particular relationship is assumed between the explained variables and the (log of) wages 
(with a potential risk of misspecification). Another, perhaps more important problem is the 
“support” problem in the distribution of the covariates. Men and women may not only differ 
in age, education and occupation…, but the distributions of these variables can overlap very 
little. This problem of lack of common support has been ignored in most studies on gender 
wage gaps. Typically, assumptions are made to extrapolate results: the behaviour of men is 
projected outside the observed range to form a comparison group for women having the same 
                                                 
1 Lalive and Stutzer (2004) investigate the importance of social norms in explaining why women do not report a 
lower job satisfaction while persistent wage gaps are observed in Switzerland. In their study, wage differentials 
between men and women are attributed to the social norms about appropriate salaries for women. However, we 
can argue that these social norms can represent a form of barriers to the integration of women to the labour 
market. 
2  A  definition  of  wage  discrimination  that  is  commonly  accepted  and  used  in  the  literature  suggests  that 
discrimination against women arises when for seemingly equal work, women earn less than men (see Altonji and 
Blank, 1999).    4 
characteristics. This can lead to misleading results since individuals are compared though they 
are not comparable. As an alternative, the attention is restricted to the common support only, 
thus ignoring a lot of information which can be useful. In addition, the policy conclusions are 
made for the whole population while the analysis is made only for its part. The importance of 
the common support problem has been largely addressed in the evaluation literature (for a 
detailed discussion, see for instance Lechner, 2001).  
 
As  an  alternative  to  the  parametric  approach,  nonparametric  methods  have  been 
proposed.  In  this  paper,  we  use  a  nonparametric  technique  which  is  based  on  matching. 
Matching methods have been widely used in the literature on evaluation in looking at the 
impact of a treatment on an outcome variable (see for instance Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 
1999). However, matching can be used in the analysis of gender wage differentials as well. In 
disentangling the explained and the unexplained components of these differentials, we have 
indeed to compute the counterfactual wage that women would receive if the distribution of 
their  characteristics  would  be  similar  to  that  of  men.  In  this  paper,  we  use  the  matching 
procedure and the decomposition of the wage gap along the lines of Nopo (2004). Nopo 
suggests using exact matching. The advantage of this procedure is that we can simultaneously 
estimate  the  common  support  and  the  mean  counterfactual  wage  for  the  women  on  the 
common  support.  In  addition,  the  decomposition  of  the  wage  gap  explicitly  accounts  for 
differences in the supports of the distributions of characteristics. Lastly, this matching method 
provides useful information on the unexplained wage gap not only at the mean, but also on the 
distribution of this gap over the entire wage distribution.  
 
However, the flexibility of this method is very costly: in the nonparametric setup, we 
face the problem of dimensionality which arises when we control for many covariates. The 
inclusion  of  many  variables  will  indeed  reduce  the  size  of  the  cells  and  the  number  of 
matches. Hence, this limits the distributional analysis of the unexplained component of the 
wage gap. This problem is attenuated if a large dataset is available. An alternative approach to 
exact  (multivariate)  matching  would  be  propensity  score  matching  which  reduces  a  high-
dimensional estimation problem to a one-dimensional case (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
However, in terms of efficiency, it is not clear whether propensity score matching is superior 
to direct matching (see the efficiency issues discussed in details by Hahn (1998); Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd (1998)). As a consequence, we compare the results of the decomposition 
                                                                                                                                                         
3 This standard decomposition has been extended by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) into a decomposition that   5 
based on exact matching with the results of decompositions based on more commonly used 
nearest-neighbour and calliper propensity score matching algorithms. 
 
Besides these methodological issues, taking account of gender differences in supports 
may also be important for policy implications. Gender differences in supports can indeed 
reflect a form of pre-labour market discrimination, because women face some “barriers to 
entry” in reaching certain individual characteristics that men achieve (see Nopo, 2004). Such 
barriers can for example be attributed to a different access to the education system, but also to 
the  fact  that  working  women  still  have  to  carry  most  of  the  burden  for  housework  and 
childcare (see Altonji and Blank, 1999; Waldfogel, 1998).
4 In the latter case, it will take a 
long time to reduce the gender wage gap, since it involves a change of social norms about 
men’s and women’s role on the labour market. As a consequence, measures facilitating the 
duality  between  work  and  family  should  prove  to  be  useful  in  reducing  gender  wage 
differentials (see for instance Blau and Kahn, 2000 for the US).  
 
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the existing 
literature on the decomposition of the wage gap. Section 3 presents some stylised facts about 
the measures aimed at promoting gender equality in Switzerland. In Section 4, data used for 
the  empirical  application  are  described  and  some  descriptive  statistics  on  gender  wage 
differentials are reported. In section 5, we present the econometrical model. Then, we discuss 
the results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                         
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in addition to the classical “endowment” and “remuneration” effects. 
4 Altonji and Blank (1999) point the importance of “pre-market human capital differences” such as differences in 
family expectations and in educational choices in explaining gender wage differences in the labour market. 
Waldfogel (1998) underlines the role of some institutional factors such as the lack of maternity leave in acting as 
structural barriers to the promotion of women with children in employment that is valuable in terms of work 
experience and thus in terms of higher pay.   6 
2  Wage gap decomposition: a literature overview 
 
 
2.1. International overview 
 
A  wide  strand  of  empirical  literature  has  focused  on  the  role  of  discrimination  in 
explaining the observed wage differentials between men and women on the labour market 
(see  Blau  and  Kahn,  1997  and  Altonji  and  Blank,  1999  for  an  overview).  Typically,  the 
question is to disentangle the part of the gap that can be explained through human capital 
endowment from the part that may result from discrimination. Human capital endowment 
(such as education, experience and other characteristics) is distributed differently between 
men and women.
5 In this case, the wage differentials are explained by some characteristics 
which  men  own  and  which  women  do  not  own  such  that  these  characteristics  are  better 
rewarded on the labour market. As a consequence, if the distribution of the characteristics 
between men and women were the same, the wage differentials would reduce by the amount 
that is attributed to differences in human capital endowment. In the literature, this component 
of the wage gap is often referred to the “explained” part. After controlling for human capital 
characteristics, the remaining wage gap (or the “unexplained” part of the wage gap) is then 
due to discrimination.
6 In accounting for this component of the gap, the counterfactual wage 
that women (resp. men) would earn if they had the same characteristics as men (resp. women) 
has been the key research element of the empirical literature.  
 
Different decomposition methods have been proposed to account for the explained and 
unexplained components of the wage gap. The most popular method is based on a parametric 
approach.  Following  Blinder  (1973)  and  Oaxaca  (1973),  thereafter  BO,  separate  wage 
functions are estimated for males  ( )
'
im im m im W X U β = +  and for females  ( )
'
if if f if W X U β = +  
with X being a vector of human capital characteristics (see Mincer’s wage equation, 1974). 
The  difference  in  average  wages  between  men  and  women  can  be  decomposed  into 
differences  in  personal  characteristics  (“endowment  effect”)  and  differences  in  returns 
(“remuneration effect”) : 
                                                 
5 For example, in their survey on race and gender differentials in the labour market, Altonji and Blank (1999) 
provide  evidence  that  differences  in  personal  characteristics  that  are  likely  to  be  related  to  wages  such  as 
education, experience and family status are observed by gender for the US. In our paper, we also find gender 
differences in these characteristics for Switzerland (see Section 4 for more details). 
6 It is partially attributed to discrimination, since it is possible that some unobserved characteristics that may 
explain the wage differentials are not controlled for.   7 
( ) ( )
' '
endowment effect remuneration effect
ˆ ˆ ˆ
m f m f m f m f W W X X X β β β − = − + −
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
 
In this decomposition, the term 
' ˆ
f m X β  represents the counterfactual wage for women if they 
were paid  as men (i.e.  if their  characteristics  were rewarded in the same way as for the 
average man). The second term of the decomposition is often interpreted as wage differences 
that may result from discrimination. However, the validity of this interpretation has widely 
been discussed in the empirical literature: omission of observed variables, pre-labour market 
discrimination, endogeneity issues that can arise in the OLS estimation of the wage regression 
and the lack of the common support can make it difficult to distinguish between the different 
components  of  the  wage  gap  and  to  assign  the  true  part  of  the  gap  that  is  due  to 
discrimination. 
 
  A potential problem inherent to the BO decomposition is the validity of the functional 
form  assumption  about  the  conditional  expectation  of  wages.  In  constructing  the 
counterfactual  wage,  it  is  assumed  that  it  is  always  possible  to  find  women  who  are 
comparable to men in terms of observed characteristics. However, a problem of comparability 
arises, because some combinations of characteristics that are common among men may not be 
observed among women. This is particularly true if job characteristics such as job occupations 
or degree of occupation are accounted for. As a consequence, the BO decomposition assumes 
that the estimates of the wage equations are valid out of the supports of the distribution of 
individual characteristics. However, some empirical evidence shows that this specification 
assumption can lead to misleading results. For instance, Barsky, Bound, Charles and Lupton 
(2001) account for the differences in earnings in explaining the wealth gap between black and 
white  households.  In  their  study,  they  provide  evidence  that  a  large  fraction  of  black 
households is not observed over a sizeable portion of the white earnings distribution. With the 
traditional BO decomposition which fails to account for these differences in the supports of 
the distributions of the characteristics, Barsky et al find that 20% of the average wealth gap is 
explained by earnings differences. On the contrary, by focusing on comparable white/black 
households only, the part of the mean wealth gap which is attributed to earnings differences 
amounts to 64%. In his study about gender wage gap in Peru, Nopo (2004) reports similar 
empirical evidence about the importance of differences in the supports in explaining the wage 
gap. First, 30% of working women cannot be matched with any men in the data and thus 
belong to the out-of-support region. Second, Nopo (2004) finds that the unexplained part of 
the gender gap is over-estimated using the BO decomposition.    8 
A second disadvantage of the BO decomposition is that it only focuses on the mean 
unexplained  wage  differences  and  does  not  explore  the  distribution  of  these  unexplained 
differences. To overcome this limitation, different approaches have been used to simulate the 
counterfactual wage distribution. For instance, in their study about the rising wage inequality 
in the USA, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) construct the hypothetical wage distributions 
using a parametric model (based on the OLS estimation of wage equations).  In addition, 
Donald,  Green  and  Paarsch  (2000)  explore  the  differences  in  wage  distributions  between 
Canada and the USA by using a parametric proportional hazard model. Other studies use 
quantile regression methods to construct counterfactual wage distributions (see for instance 
Poterba  and  Rueben,  1994  and  Melly,  2005  for  studies  about  public-private  sector  wage 
differentials for respectively the US and Germany; Garcia et al, 2001 and Albrecht et al, 2004 
investigate the gender wage gap using quantile regressions for respectively Spain and the 
Netherlands). As an alternative to parametric strategies, the counterfactual wage distribution 
can also be simulated using nonparametric techniques. For instance, in their study about wage 
inequality in the USA from 1979 to 1988, DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) study the 
effect of changes in labour market institutions on the distribution of wages. They construct the 
synthetic  wage  distribution  that  would  have  been  observed  in  1988  if  the  labour  market 
institutions of 1979 had remained unchanged using the observed wage distribution in 1988 by 
applying  kernel  density  methods  to  re-weighted  samples.  Similarly,  Barsky  et  al  (2001) 
propose  a  nonparametric  alternative  to  the  usual  BO  decomposition.  They  simulate  the 
counterfactual wealth distribution by re-weighting white households such that their earnings 
distribution coincides with the actual earnings distribution of black households. Contrary to 
the study by DiNardo et al (1996), there is only one single explanatory variable in the study 
by Barsky et al. This avoids the problem of dimensionality that arises in the study by DiNardo 
et al. In the nonparametric setup, Nopo (2004) also investigates the distribution of the wage 
gap  but  in  presence  of  many  explanatory  variables.  In  addition,  he  proposes  a  new 
decomposition technique that accounts for the above mentioned problem of the differences in 
the supports.  
 
 
2.2. Swiss studies 
 
In the last decade, the issue of gender wage differences has been the focus of a number 
of studies in Switzerland. Since the seminal work by Kugler (1988), about ten studies have 
been published in this area. Table 1  gives  an  overview of these studies.  It indicates that   9 
different estimation methods of wage equations and different data sets have been used. This 
leads not surprisingly to diverse results which do not help in the current public debate on 
gender  wage  differences  (OFS,  2003).  Most  studies  analysing  the  gender  wage  gap  in 
Switzerland are based on parametric methods and use the BO decomposition for wages.  
 
By  combining  data  from  the  Health  Survey,  the  Income  and  Wealth  Survey  and 
merging them with a supplement survey on labour supply, Kugler (1988) examines the gender 
wage gap for a sample of about 2500 individuals. Using the traditional BO decomposition, he 
finds that 93% of the gender wage gap of 43% can be accounted for. Brüderl et al (1993) use 
data from the 1987 International Social Survey Program and find a total wage gap of 81% and 
an unexplained wage gap of 38%. A range of studies conduct the gender wage gap analysis 
using the data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS). Depending on the estimation 
techniques and the variables used in these analyses, the studies find a gender wage gap of 
20%-40% of which about 10%-20% cannot be explained by the specification used in these 
studies. The study by Sousa-Poza (2003) is the only study that uses the first 11 waves from 
the SLFS. After controlling for personal characteristics such as education, foreigner status, 
experience and for job characteristics such as tenure, firm size and industry sector dummies, 
between 50% and 60% of the wage gap still remains unexplained. This is rather different from 
the result obtained in Bonjour (1997) for example. We argue that these differences are due to 
differences in the specification of the wage equations. In addition, the endogeneity problem 
associated with variables such as tenure is not accounted for in the study by Sousa-Poza. On 
the contrary, in Bonjour (1997), different estimation techniques of the wage equations have 
been proposed to take the endogeneity problem into consideration. However, all these studies 
are based on the traditional BO decomposition that fails to recognise the problem of gender 
differences  in  the  supports  of  the  explanatory  variables.  Since  gender  occupational 
segregation is found to be important in the Swiss labour market (see OFS, 2003), assuming 
that all working women are comparable to working men will lead to misleading results.  
 
Bonjour and Gerfin (2001) is the only Swiss study that uses a distributional analysis: 
they  examine  how  the  unexplained  component  of  the  wage  gap  varies  over  the  wage 
distribution.  To  calculate  the  counterfactual  wage  distribution,  they  use  the  proportional 
hazard model proposed by Donald et al (2000) to estimate density wage functions. Their main 
finding is that the unexplained component of the wage gap is distributed unequally across the   10 
wage distribution. It is actually declining over the range of wages. This indicates that at the 
lower end of the wage distribution, a large part of wage difference is due to discrimination. 
On the contrary, at the upper end of the wage distribution, most of the gender gap is explained 
by differences in human capital endowment. An analysis by specific variables shows that it is 
a low level of education that explains why the discrimination component of the wage gap is 
over-proportional at low wages. In their study, the BO decomposition is extended to explore 
the distribution of the unexplained wage differences. However, this strategy still ignores the 
problem of gender differences in the supports that we want to address in this paper. 
 
In this paper, we examine the gender wage gap by using a nonparametric econometric 
method which has been proposed by Nopo (2004). To our knowledge, there is no empirical 
study for Switzerland that applies matching to investigate the gender wage gap. In this study, 
we consider that gender is a treatment variable. In order to construct the counterfactual mean 
wage of women, we then match women to the sample of men having the same observed 
characteristics. Finally, the counterfactual wage is obtained by taking the average wage over 
the observations for men providing a matched observation. As argued by Nopo, this matching 
procedure does not require the estimation of any wage functions. As a consequence, we do not 
have to face the issue of doing incorrect inferences due to assumptions that are no valid in the 
out of common support region. 
Table 1: Overview of the Swiss studies on the gender wage gap. 
Authors Data Period Decomposition Wage gap Unexplained 
in % component in %**
Kugler (1988) 3 datasets  1981-1982 Oaxaca-Blinder 43 7
merged
Brüderl, Diekmann and Engelhardt (1993) ISSP 1987 Oaxaca-Blinder 81 38
Diekmann and Engelhardt (1995) SLFS 1991 Oaxaca-Blinder 43 16
Bonjour (1997) SLFS 1991-1993 Oaxaca-Blinder 26 [9-13]
Henneberger and Sousa-Poza (1998) SLFS 1995 Oaxaca-Blinder 29 [10-16]
Henneberger and Sousa-Poza (1999) SLFS 1997 Oaxaca-Blinder 24 [8-11]
Flückiger and Ramirez (2000) SWSS 1994-1996 Oaxaca-Blinder 30 17
Bonjour and Gerfin (2001) SLFS 1991-1995 Oaxaca-Blinder 21 10
semiparametric* 21 8
Sousa-Poza (2002) SWSS 1998 Oaxaca-Blinder [18-28] [14-19]
Sousa-Poza (2003) SLFS 1991-2001 Oaxaca-Blinder [23-28] [50-65]
Notes: SLFS (Swiss Labour Force Survey); SWSS (Swiss Wage Structure Survey); ISSP (International Social Survey Programme);
Kugler (Health Survey, Income and Health Survey, supplementary survey on labor supply); * the numbers correspond to the 50%
quantile of the wage distribution and ** relative to the raw wage gap.    11 
3  Promotion of gender equality in Switzerland 
 
 
3.1. Legal framework: 
 
In terms of national legislation in equal pay and equal opportunity, Switzerland is 
lagging behind the other OECD countries. The Swiss Federal Constitution was amended in 
1981  and  explicitly  stated  that  women  and  men  must  be  equally  paid  for  equal  work. 
However, the first federal law on equal wage and equal opportunity came into force only in 
July 1996. The objective of this law is to promote actually equality between men and women 
(article 1). As a consequence, direct or indirect sexual discrimination in hiring/firing, in tasks’ 
repartition, in remuneration, in professional training and in job promotion is forbidden. In all 
cases (except for hiring), it is presumed that discrimination arises when the concerned person 
can show that discrimination is likely and when the employer cannot prove that there is no 
discrimination (article 6). According to articles 3 and 4, the disadvantaged person can bring 
an action for damages. However, the federal law does not stipulate that any office has to be 
designed to make investigations when cases of discrimination arise and to bring actions for 
damages in case of violation of the law. It is the responsibility of the victim to attend an action 
in front of the competent authorities.  
 
Concerning  international  legislation,  Switzerland  has  ratified  in  1997  the  UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
This  ratification  should  help  in  promoting  the  equality  between  men  and  women  in 
Switzerland. However, the federal structure of Switzerland implies that the Confederation is 
responsible for the application of international standards while cantons are the competent 
authorities which own their own political and juridical institutions. In this case, the principle 
of equality between men and women is defined on an area for which the same authority has 
the competence. Even though, it is possible to appeal to the Federal Court in order to have a 
uniform application of the federal law and the international standards, the Federal Court does 
not intervene in actions that belong to the cantonal authority. As a consequence, the federal 
structure of Switzerland poses some issues of policy coherence. This has also been stressed in 
the  reports  of  the  CEDAW  in  January  2003.  These  reports  underline  the  necessity  of 
coordinating the application of the Convention between the different administrative levels 
(federal, cantonal and communal).    12 
3.2. Court practice: 
 
The lack of coordination and transparency is reflected in the small number of actions 
intended in front of the Federal Court. Since the amendment of the Constitution, only 65 
actions  regarding  equal  wage  have  been  observed.  Among  them,  two  actions  concern 
employees  in  the  private  sector.  The  small  number  of  suitcases  is  essentially  due  to  the 
difficulty of bringing proofs of the existence of discrimination, especially in terms of equal 
value of the work. In addition, the length and the costs of suits can discourage women of 
undertaking any action in front of the court. Moreover, some wage differentials can be found 
to be legitimate. It is indeed possible that some personal and social considerations such as age 
and family tasks that do not directly influence the work activity are accepted in justifying 
some observed wage differentials. The differences observed in terms of wages and hours of 
work are thus more explained by the difficulties which women face in combining work and 
family than by differences in terms of education and human capital. The CEDAW report on 
the  actual  measures  struggling  against  gender  discrimination  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
helping the combination between work and family and promoting the repartition of family 
tasks between men and women should prove to be worthwhile in increasing gender equality in 
Switzerland. As a consequence, Switzerland has to pursue its efforts in encouraging more 
equality between men and women. 
 
 
3.3. Evolution since the last 30 years 
 
In order to evaluate the progress and the pitfalls established in the area of equality, 
regular detailed surveys by gender have to be undertaken. This is one of the main objectives 
of the Federal Law of Statistic in 1992. This law explicitly mentions that statistical data have 
to be systematically elaborated for each of the genders. In addition, a report giving the actual 
state in the promotion of equality between women and men has to be regularly published. For 
this purpose, the Federal Statistical Office has published 2 reports on equality between men 
and women in 1993 and 1996. In addition, two recent OFS reports have appeared in 2003 and 
2005: the report of 2003 presents some detailed indicators about gender equality in different 
areas such as education, working life and wages, social security and poverty, while the report 
of 2005 gives an overview of the situation in gender equality for the period from 1970 to 
2000.  
   13 
These  reports  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  progress  and  stagnation  are  observed  in 
measures aimed at promoting equality between women and men over the last 3 decades. 
Appendix A.1 shows that gender differences with respect to education have narrowed in time. 
Since 1980, the share of individuals without post-obligatory schooling has reduced by 50%. 
Nowadays, women are more likely to complete apprenticeship training than two decades ago. 
In addition, the proportion of women with a tertiary degree has more than doubled over this 
period.  Similarly,  female  participation  rates  have  continuously  increased  over  the  period 
1970-2000. Despite this increase, the Swiss labour market remains still segmented. Indeed, 
full-time positions are primarily occupied by men while women are essentially working part-
time (see Appendix A.1). Another indicator of equality is the proportion of men and women 
in  different  job  positions.  Between  1970  and  2000,  the  fraction  of  women  having  a 
supervisory function has continuously increased (see OFS report, 2005). This evolution is 
attributed to the progress in educational attendance of women. However, women remain still 
confined in female dominated sectors such as health care, clerical work and services (see 
Appendix  A.1).  The  last,  but  not  the  least  indicator  of  gender  inequality  concerns  wage 
differentials. On average, women earn less than men. The gap amounts to 21% in the private 
sector and to 10% in the public sector. In both sectors, the gender wage gap has decreased 
between 1994 and 1998, but it has remained at its level thereafter (see Appendix A.2). If wage 
differentials exist for all economic sectors, these gaps vary a lot across the sector of activity.  
   14 
4  Data and descriptive statistics 
 
 
4.1. Some facts about raw gender wage gaps 
 
This section presents some descriptive statistics about the raw gender wage gap using 
the data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey that have been used in the empirical analysis. 
The general trend is that the raw gap has narrowed between 1996 and 2003: on average, 
women earn 32% less than men in 1996 compared to 25% in 2003 (see Table 2).
7 A further 
look at the different years seems to indicate that over the period 1996-2000, the raw gap 
decreases: it is the lowest in 2000 when the unemployment rate reaches its lowest level after 
the recession period of the beginning of the 1990s. There is however an exception for 1997 
where the raw gap is low, but the unemployment rate reaches its highest level in Switzerland. 
Notably, the official statistics from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office tells us that that was 
the only year from our observation window when unemployment of women was lower than 
unemployment of men.
8 From 2001, the raw wage gap remains relatively constant. This is in 
line with the recent recession observed since the beginning of this decade. 
 
Table  2  displays  the  raw  wage  gap  at  some  selected  quantiles  of  the  total  wage 
distribution and conditional on some observed characteristics. The absolute wage gap at, for 
example, the 25
th quantile is the difference between the wage at the 25
th quantile in the male 
distribution and the wage at the 25
th quantile in the female distribution. The relative wage gap 
at a 25
th quantile is the ratio of the absolute wage gap at the 25% quantile to the wage at the 
25
th quantile in the female distribution in that year. For the period 1996-2003, Table 2 shows 
that men at the 25
th quantile earn about 26.7% (or 4.82 CHF) more than women at the 25
th 
quantile of their wage distribution. The raw gender gap varies considerably across the wage 
distribution and also by observed characteristics. Over the entire wage distribution, the raw 
gender wage gap has a convex U-shape. By educational level, the raw gap is higher for low 
educated individuals, especially at the lower end of their wage distribution. However, at the 
upper end of the wage distribution, the raw gap is the highest for high educated individuals 
                                                 
7 The statistics presented in Table 2 are based on the selected samples used in the empirical analysis. The 
population in a particular year refers to the workers of that corresponding year satisfying the sample selection 
rules such as being not self-employed, not a student or a worker older than 55 (see Section 4.2). 
8 In Switzerland, two unemployment indicators are used: the statistic of unemployed registered at the regional 
job placement offices and which is drawn up by the State Secretary for Economic Affairs (Seco) and the statistic 
recorded by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) which corresponds to the ILO standard unemployment   15 
and  the  lowest  for  low  educated  individuals.  This  raises  the  question  whether  these 
differentials  still  remain  after  controlling  for  observed  characteristics.  Table  2  further 
indicates that the gap is wider in the private sector than in the public sector. Similar behaviour 
of the raw wage gap is described in Melly (2005). This seems to hold over the entire wage 
distribution. 
 
Table 2: Absolute and relative raw gender wage gap at mean and selected quantiles. 
year in CHF in % in CHF in % in CHF in % in CHF in % in CHF in % in CHF in %
1996 7.43 31.7% 4.73 35.6% 5.43 32.9% 5.71 26.9% 7.63 28.1% 12.46 37.1%
1997 5.83 24.2% 4.59 34.1% 5.26 31.5% 5.46 25.3% 7.17 26.2% 10.39 30.0%
1998 6.79 28.7% 4.13 29.6% 4.80 27.7% 4.93 22.3% 7.16 25.9% 10.86 31.5%
1999 6.57 27.1% 4.74 33.8% 4.41 24.9% 4.92 21.9% 7.00 24.9% 10.54 30.1%
2000 5.72 22.4% 4.93 35.3% 4.56 25.6% 4.64 20.2% 7.08 24.6% 11.21 31.8%
2001 6.40 24.6% 4.93 33.5% 4.80 26.4% 5.37 23.0% 8.23 27.8% 11.48 30.5%
2002 7.04 27.5% 4.09 26.6% 4.49 24.4% 5.03 21.4% 8.35 28.2% 12.12 32.4%
2003 6.62 25.0% 3.98 25.6% 4.15 21.9% 4.99 20.7% 8.10 26.6% 12.69 33.1%
1996-2003
Total 6.65 26.0% 4.80 33.2% 4.82 26.7% 5.13 22.1% 7.81 26.5% 11.63 31.6%
Education
low 3.70 18.9% 4.22 36.6% 4.35 29.4% 4.66 26.1% 4.00 18.3% 3.23 11.8%
medium 3.73 14.9% 3.99 26.3% 3.74 20.1% 3.29 14.1% 3.99 14.0% 5.72 16.5%
high 7.68 22.6% 4.65 23.9% 4.71 18.8% 6.78 21.9% 9.48 24.7% 12.94 27.2%
Sector
private 7.56 31.5% 5.19 37.4% 5.50 32.3% 6.12 28.6% 8.73 32.0% 13.02 37.5%
public 6.96 24.7% 3.80 22.8% 4.88 23.3% 6.01 23.0% 8.67 27.1% 10.54 26.6%
at the 75th quantile at the 90th quantile mean at the 10th quantile at the 25th quantile at the 50th quantile
 
Notes: own computations from SLFS data; wages refer to hourly wages; the absolute wage gap is 
measured in current CHF and the relative wage gap in % of female wages.  
 
 
4.2. Description of the variables used  
 
  This section presents the variables used in the empirical analysis. This study is based 
on the data of the Swiss Labour Force Survey collected by the Swiss Federal Office since 
1991. The Survey is carried out once a year, during the 2
nd quarter (April-June). It covers the 
population of persons aged 15 or more who are permanent residents in Switzerland (at least 
for one year).
9 The Swiss Labour Force Survey provides important internationally comparable 
information on the labour market situation in Switzerland. Each year approximately 16'000 
persons randomly drawn from the phone register of the Swiss PTT are interviewed.
10 As a 
                                                                                                                                                          
definition. The Swiss data for the OECD statistics are provided by the SFSO and are based on the SLFS data. In 
this paper, we use the unemployment definition according to the SFSO. 
9 Individuals living in Switzerland during a short period, the cross-border workers and the refugees are excluded. 
10 From 2002, the number of persons randomly chosen increased to about 40’000 persons.   16 
consequence, all persons having no telephone are not covered by the survey. Participation is 
voluntary. Questions are asked on work activity, professional experience, working times and 
conditions, job seeking, former occupation, reasons for not being economically active and 
incomes. The data collected provide information about socio-demographic characteristics of 
the employed, unemployed and inactive individuals.  
 
This empirical study uses the waves from 1996 to 2003. We choose to not use the first 
waves from 1991 to 1995, because gender wage gap in Switzerland has been widely studied 
for  this  period.  In  addition,  the  sample  size  in  each  of  these  years  was  small  making  it 
insufficient for our matching procedure. As mentioned before, approximately 16’000 persons 
were interviewed each year. This sample size changes to about 40’000 persons from 2002. 
That is why we prefer to focus on the second part of the decade. The data set consists of a 
rotating  panel:  each  year,  one  fifth  of  the  individuals  already  included  in  the  sample  is 
replaced and the other four fifths are re-interviewed. As a consequence, an individual can stay 
in the sample for at most 5 consecutive years.  
 
The empirical analysis concentrates on workers who are not self-employed, not in the 
agricultural sector, not in a training programme (apprenticeship) or completing compulsory 
military service. We do not take people in agricultural sector, because their earnings are likely 
to be explained by random factors such as weather conditions. Similarly, we do not include 
self-employed, because it is difficult to distinguish between returns to human capital from 
returns to physical capital. In addition, we exclude students and employees older than 55, 
since they are also involved in the education and retirement decisions which are different 
from the employment decision. Finally, we drop all observations for which missing values are 
observed.
11 Hourly wages are calculated using the yearly (net) labour income and the number 
of normal weekly working hours. In our study, we do not account for holidays, since they are 
paid. Two points concerning our sample should be discussed briefly. First, the definition of 
hourly wages is restrictive, since we are implicitly assuming that individuals employed during 
the  reference  period  are  employed  during  the  entire  year.  With  the  use  of  yearly  labour 
income, it is thus not possible to identify persons who were without a job during a part of the 
year. This implies that hourly wages will be under-estimated. Second, our study concentrates 
only on wage earners. We are primarily interested in the hourly wage a woman would get if 
                                                 
11 In 2003, the final data set contains 20’838 individuals (9’958 women and 10’880 men). For other years, see 
Appendix A.4.    17 
the distribution of her characteristics would be similar to that of men. Selectivity issue that 
arises in the estimation of women’s wage functions is beyond the scope of this paper.
12 As a 
consequence, our results must be interpreted conditional on the population of employees.  
 
Although  our  non-parametric  approach  eliminates  the  problem  of  specification  of 
earnings equation, it does not eliminate the problem of choice of variables. Appendix A.3 
presents the variables we use for the decomposition of gender wage gap. They include human 
capital  characteristics  such  as  age  and  education,  personal  characteristics  such  as  marital 
status,  household  composition  and  foreign  citizenship.  We  further  control  for  job 
characteristics  with  variables  capturing  firm  size,  job  position,  industry  sector  and  work 
experience. Overall, we control for 12 variables that are found to be important in explaining 
wages in the classical literature on the gender wage gap (see the survey by Altonji and Blank, 
1999). Our choice of variables is based on the human capital theory (Becker, 1974, Mincer, 
1974). In the simple Mincerian wage equation, the education and experience variables are 
considered to be the most important determinants of wages. We further include demographic 
and job characteristics to explain earnings more precisely. Including controls for experience, 
job position and industry sector may be questionable to the extent they may be an outcome of 
discrimination. Despite this potential endogeneity problem, we believe that these variables 
have  an  important  role  in  explaining  the  wages  and  cannot  be  ignored  in  our  matching 
procedure. We also control for marital status and presence of young children, because we 
believe that this influences labour decisions of women in Switzerland. Moreover, Waldfogel 
(1998) finds evidence of a negative effect of children on women’s and men’s wages even after 
controlling for labour market experience.  
 
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for male and female employees. Men are 
over-represented  among  high  educated  workers.  There  are  many  more  married  men  than 
married women (this is due to the sample selection of working women). This is also reflected 
in women’s lower number of children. Women also have a lower level of work experience, 
are more likely to be employed in small firms and less likely to have a responsibility function.  
                                                 
12 In the literature, it is common to correct the selectivity bias by applying a sample selection model which takes 
the participation decision of women into account. After using the Heckman’s two-stage procedure, “potential” 
wages of actually non-working women can be imputed from those women who are actually working. In order to 
be  valid,  the  Heckman  correction  technique  requires  the  availability  of  instruments  that  are  related  to  the 
propensity to work but not to wages. Since, in practice such exclusion restrictions are hard to find, this highlights 
the potential weakness of the Heckman approach.    18 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for 1996 and 2003. 
year
Variables Women Men Women Men
Wages in CHF/hour 23.46 30.88 26.52 33.14
Socio-demographics
Age
15-24 53.85 46.15 52.24 47.76
25-29 43.14 56.86 50.32 49.68
30-34 43.74 56.26 44.72 55.28
35-39 41.05 58.95 45.94 54.06
40-44 41.78 58.22 46.08 53.92
45-49 46.53 53.47 45.93 54.07
50-55 44.86 55.14 48.11 51.89
Marital status
single 46.40 53.60 47.42 52.58
married 39.92 60.08 44.53 55.47
divorced 68.95 31.05 62.60 37.40
widowed 82.26 17.74 79.81 20.19
Level of education 
primary 58.03 41.97 53.09 46.91
secondary 48.34 51.66 52.11 47.89
tertiary 25.34 74.66 34.38 65.62
Foreign citizenship
Swiss 46.42 53.58 49.46 50.54
Foreign 39.09 60.91 40.31 59.69
Children
With children under 15 37.25 62.75 44.97 55.03
Without children under 15 48.74 51.26 48.68 51.32
Regional characteristics
Region of residence*
Deutschschweiz 44.01 55.99 47.12 52.88
Westschweiz 46.45 53.55 47.96 52.04
Job characteristics
Firm size
less than 20 workers 48.51 51.49 52.78 47.22
between 20 and 99 workers 38.14 61.86 43.47 56.53
more than 99 workers 41.06 58.94 40.78 59.22
Responsibility function
without 53.52 46.48 56.58 43.42
with  30.39 69.61 33.17 66.83
1996 2003
 
Notes: own computations, Table 3 continues on the next page.    19 
Table 3: (…cont.). 
year
Variables Women Men Women Men
Job characteristics
Occupation
managers 16.48 83.52 28.59 71.41
academicians 29.80 70.20 36.66 63.34
technicians 53.03 46.97 57.07 42.93
clerical workers 66.40 33.60 69.73 30.27
services 72.27 27.73 67.09 32.91
operators 59.26 40.74 60.63 39.37
handworkers 11.76 88.24 15.23 84.77
assistants 18.13 81.87 14.06 85.94
Work type contract
non permanent 50.64 49.36 53.82 46.18
permanent 44.29 55.71 46.92 53.08
Public sector
no 39.09 60.91 40.28 59.72
yes 61.23 38.77 65.53 34.47
Work experience
less than 6 months 61.52 38.48 59.76 40.24
between 6 and 24 months 60.10 39.90 65.51 34.49
between 2 and 5 years 61.73 38.27 60.79 39.21
more than 5 years 40.23 59.77 43.19 56.81
Observations 2794 3069 9958 10880
1996 2003
 
Notes: own computations, results for the other years are presented in Appendix A.4. 
 
There  is  a  strong  occupational  segregation:  typically  female  occupations  are  clerical  and 
services work, whereas men are more likely to work as operators, handworkers and assistants, 
but  also  in  higher  occupation  such  as  managers  and  academicians.  This  occupational 
segregation  is  also  reflected  in  women’s  higher  propensity  to  work  in  the  public  sector. 
Turning to the evolution of personal and job characteristics in time, women are more similar 
to men in 2003 than in 1996: the share of women with a tertiary education increases from 
25.34% in 1996 to 34.38% in 2003.
13 Similarly, women are more likely to occupy a position 
with a responsibility function or a high qualified position such as manager in 2003 than in 
1996. Finally, women are more likely to have a higher work experience in 2003 than in 1996. 
                                                 
13 In addition, Appendix A.1. shows that the proportion of women with a tertiary degree is 8.3% in 2000 against 
2.7% in 1980. For men, this proportion is 13.8% in 2000 against 8% in 1980. More details can be found in the 
OFS reports (2003 and 2005).    20 
5  Decomposition of the gender wage gap using matching 
 
 
We begin this section with the description of the matching procedure which we use in 
the empirical analysis. In the second point, we address some issues related to our matching 
estimator: in particular, we discuss the limitations of our procedure and the potential biases of 
the resulting estimates.  
 
 
5.1. Description of the matching procedure 
 
This  section  draws  on  Nopo’s  study.  Nopo  (2004)  develops  a  simple  matching 
procedure to construct the counterfactual wage. Based on this procedure, Nopo suggests a 
new  decomposition  technique  that  accounts  for  gender  differences  in  the  distribution  of 
individual characteristics. This approach is a fully nonparametric method, since one does no 
longer need to estimate a linear wage regression function. Second, the counterfactual mean 
wage is simulated only for the common support. This implies that no assumption on the out-
of-support region is required. In order to construct the counterfactual wage, Nopo (2004) uses 
a matching procedure that selects two sub-samples of men and women who have the same 
characteristics.  
 
Let  ( ) ( ) ,
m g x E W X x m = =  denote the average wage for men with characteristics x, 
( )
m F x  the cumulative distribution function of individual characteristics x among men and 
m S  the support of the distribution of characteristics for men. Define  ( ) .
f g ,  ( ) .
f F  and 
f S  
similarly for women. The key idea in Nopo’s approach is that the supports of the distributions 
of characteristics for women and men might not completely overlap, so that decomposing the 
wage gap into two parts, the “endowment” and “remuneration” effects, has to be done for the 
common  support  only.  For  this  purpose,  let 
m f S S S = ∩   be  the  common  support  and 
( ) ( )
m
S m S p p X S m dF x = ∈ =∫  be the probability measure of the set S under the distribution 
( ) .
m dF . Then, one can divide  the male population into two subpopulations composed of 
individuals having characteristics that belong either to the common support S or to the out of 
the common support S : 
   21 
( ) ( ) ( ) S S m S S m E W m E W m p E W m p = +               (1) 
Since  ( ) 1 S m S m p p X S m p = ∈ = − , we can rewrite equation (1) as following: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) S S S m S E W m p E W m E W m E W m   = − +             (1’) 
 
Similar computations can be done for women and we get the following expression: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) S S S f S E W f p E W f E W f E W f   = − +             (2) 
 
Equations (1’) and (2) permit to write the total gender wage gap ∆: 
( ) ( ) E W m E W f ∆ ≡ −                   (3) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  + S S S S S m S S f S
I II III
E W m E W f p E W m E W m p E W f E W f       ∆ = − − + −       ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
 
 
Part I of this expression involves the differences of wages between men and women over the 
common support only, while part II (resp. III) concerns wage differences between men (resp. 
women) in and out-of-the support.  
 
Finally, part I in equation (3) can be decomposed as in BO decomposition by adding 
and  subtracting  the  counterfactual  mean  wage  ( ) ( )
m f
S S g x dF x ∫   with  ( )
f
S dF x   being  the 
density of characteristics in the subpopulation of women belonging to the common support.
14 
The counterfactual wage represents the average wage of women they would get if they were 
paid as men possessing the same characteristics. We obtain the following expression: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
m m f f
S S S S S S E W m E W f g x dF x g x dF x − ≡ − ∫ ∫  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
m m f m f f
S S S S S S S E W m E W f g x dF x dF x g x g x dF x     − = − + −     ∫ ∫   (4) 
 
As  in  BO  decomposition,  the  first  and  the  second  parts  of  equation  (4)  represent  the 
“explained” and the “unexplained” parts of the wage gap, but now on the common support 
only. In the linear model, this corresponds to ( )
' ˆ
m m f X X β −  and to ( )
' ˆ ˆ
m f f X β β − .  
 
As a consequence, the Nopo’s decomposition involves 4 components:   22 
m x o f ∆ = ∆ +∆ +∆ +∆                   (5) 
with 
( ) ( ) m S S m S p E W m E W m   ∆ = −  , 
( ) ( ) ( )  
m m f
x S S S g x dF x dF x   ∆ = −   ∫   
( ) ( ) ( )
m f f
o S S g x g x dF x   ∆ = −   ∫  and 
( ) ( ) f S S f S p E W f E W f   ∆ = −   . 
 
The component  m ∆  stands for the part of the gap that can be explained by differences 
between  men  in  and  men  out  of  the  common  support,  i.e.  between  those  men  whose 
characteristics can be matched to women’s characteristics and those who remain unmatched. 
For instance, it is possible to observe men of 35 years old with a university degree who have 
been working for more than 8 years at managerial occupations, but it is not possible to find 
women with a similar combination of characteristics. This component of the gap would drop 
to zero if there were no man with characteristics x such that is it impossible to find a similar 
woman  ( ) 0 S m p =  or if unmatched men and matched men were on average equally paid 
( ) ( ) S S E W m E W m = . The component  f ∆  has a similar interpretation between matched and 
unmatched  women.  For  this  component,  we  cannot  find  men  who  have  the  same 
characteristics as women. For instance, it is possible to observe Swiss married women of 45 
years old with obligatory schooling and with 2-3 years of work experience, while we cannot 
find similar men.  
 
As previously mentioned the components  x ∆  and  o ∆  represent the “endowment” and 
“remuneration” effects of the gap as in BO decomposition. The component  x ∆  represents the 
part of the wage gap that can be explained by differences in the distribution of human capital 
variables between men and women (but over the common support). For example, it is possible 
to observe both men and women with a university degree, but men are more represented in 
this category than women. As a consequence,  x ∆  represents the decrease in the wage gap 
should the distribution of female characteristics become the same as the distribution of male 
characteristics over the common support. Lastly, the component  o ∆  captures the residual part 
                                                                                                                                                         
14  ( ) ( )/ f f dF x dF x p S S m =  is scaled such that the integral integrates to one.   23 
of the wage gap. The methodological issues that arise in the matching procedure have a direct 
impact on the interpretation of  o ∆ . That is why we discuss this component in more details in 
Section 5.2. 
 
Contrary to the BO decomposition, we compare unmatched women not to hypothetical 
(non-existing) men, but rather to observed (existing) matched women. This guarantees that we 
are comparing comparable individuals. As a consequence, there is no need to make additional 
assumptions out of the support. In addition, the component  m ∆  in equation (5) sheds some 
light on wage differences that can be attributed to the fact that some characteristics that men 
typically own are not observed among women and these characteristics are highly rewarded 
(if this component is positive) in the labour market. 
 
  Nopo (2004) proposes a matching procedure in order to estimate the counterfactual 
wage and the four components of the decomposition. In this procedure, gender is considered 
to be the treatment variable. The counterfactual wage for women stands for the wage women 
would earn, had they been men.
15 It is estimated by averaging the observed wage of the men 
with  the  same  characteristics.  This  is  done  under  the  assumption  that  the  observed 
characteristics explain the productivity and earnings of individuals. Assumptions underlying 
the matching procedure are discussed further in Section 5.2. Table 4 presents the matching 
algorithm.  
                                                 
15  To  build  this  counterfactual,  we  take  women  without  replacement  and  men  with  replacement.  As  an 
alternative, we can take men without replacement and women with replacement in order to simulate the male 
wages men would earn, had they been women. This is similar to the male and female BO wage decompositions. 
We did the estimation with these two definitions of the counterfactual and we get the same qualitative results.   24 
Table 4: Matching algorithm for the estimation of the four components 
Step1   For each woman in the sample, do steps 2 and 3. 
Step2  Select  all  observations  from  the  sub-sample  of  men  who  have  the  same 
characteristics as the woman of step 1. Do not remove these selected observations 
such that they can be used again. Denote these men as matched. If no observations 
are  selected  in  this  step,  denote  the  woman  chosen  in  step  1  as  unmatched, 
otherwise as matched.  
Step3  Compute the counterfactual wage of the woman selected in step 1 as the weighted 
average wage of the men selected in step 2. 
Step4  Compute  , , m x o ∆ ∆ ∆  and  f ∆  using the actual wage variable, the new synthetic 
wage variable and the “match” dummy variable (which is coded by 1 whenever a 
woman (resp. a man) is matched to a man (resp. a woman)). 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) , , m m m unmatched m matched p unmatched E W m E W m   ∆ = −  ; 
( ) ( ) , , x m matched f matched E W m E W m ∆ = − ; 
( ) ( ) , , o f matched f matched E W m E W f ∆ = − ; 
( ) ( ) ( ) , , f f f matched f unmatched p unmatched E W f E W f   ∆ = −   ,  
where  ( ) m p unmatched   ( ) ( ) resp.  f p unmatched  are the empirical probabilities of 
being unmatched conditional on being a man (resp. a woman). 
Notes: matching is done with replacement (the same man can be used more than once in forming the 
control group); exact matches are used (see Imbens, 2004 for a detailed survey about the different 





5.2. Methodological issues to our matching estimator 
 
                                                 
16 To impute the counterfactual outcomes, matching estimators use outcomes of the nearest neighbours. Given a 
metric  such  as  Euclidian  or  Mahalanobis  distance  and  given  the  fact  that  matching  is  with  or  without 
replacement, the objective is to choose the number of matches needed to form the control group. In case of 
matching  without replacement, matched pairs are formed and the average treatment effect on the treated is 
obtained by averaging differences in outcomes within the pairs. In case of matching with replacement, Abadie 
and Imbens (2004a) implement a matching estimator where a treated observation is matched with a fixed number 
of  control  observations  (the  first  M  nearest  neighbours).  In  this  framework,  they  show  that  the  matching 
estimator is subject to a bias, because matching is not exact. The order of the bias is given by the dimension of 
the continuous variables which are used for the matching procedure. Abadie and Imbens (2004a) provide an 
estimator that removes this bias and  which is  N  consistent and asymptotically normal. This estimator is 
implemented as an ado file in STATA (see Abadie et al, 2003).   25 
One of the central statistics of interest in our work is the component  o ∆ . It is formally 
identical to the average treatment effect on the treated  (ATET) which  has received  great 
attention in the literature about evaluation of ALMP. In our case though, treatment is being a 
woman as compared to non-treatment – being a man. In order to be able to identify this 
ATET,  the  estimation  of  a  counterfactual  outcome  (wage)  is  required.  In  the  evaluation 
literature, the conditional independence assumption (CIA) about the treatment assignment is 
made  (see  Lechner,  1999  and  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin,  1983  refer  to  this  assumption  as 
“unconfoundedness”). CIA means that after having controlled for observable characteristics 
X, there are no variables left out that are both correlated with the potential outcome  0 Y  and the 
treatment D. The plausibility of this assumption has been largely debated in the economic 
literature. However, the question is not whether we should compare treated and untreated, 
rather which variables should be controlled for and this determines which individuals would 
be matched.  
 
In the gender wage gap literature, it is difficult to disentangle the wage differences that 
arise from unobserved characteristics from the true discrimination. In this context, CIA would 
imply  that  after  controlling  for  X,  there  are  no  unobserved  characteristics  which  are 
productivity  relevant  to  explain  wages.
17  All  remaining  wage  differences  would  be  thus 
attributed  to  discrimination.  As  we  discuss  in  Section  4,  we  control  for  education  and 
experience, variables that are found to be important factors of wages in the human capital 
theory. In addition, education and experience differ by gender: the probability of being a man 
is larger when experience is higher, since we can suspect that women will experience more 
career breaks due to childbearing reasons. Similarly, we expect that men are more educated 
than  women.  As  previously  mentioned,  we  also  control  for  job  characteristics  and  some 
personal  characteristics  which  we  think  they  are  important  factors  to  determine  wages. 
However, we cannot be sure that we control for all productivity relevant characteristics which 
are both correlated with wages and with gender. Nevertheless, we can still apply matching to 
estimate the counterfactual wage. We have only to be careful in the interpretation of  o ∆ : the 
resulting  wage  differences  after  controlling  for  X  are  only  partially  attributed  to 
discrimination. The component  o ∆  overestimates the true effect of discrimination. Basically, 
the same issues about the choice of variables arise as in the parametric setup of the BO 
decomposition.   26 
In  addition  to  this  problem  of  choice  of  variables,  we  encounter  the  problem  of 
potential endogeneity in some variables just as in the parametric case. Occupation and job 
position  may  be  themselves  an  outcome  of  discrimination,  and  thus  they  should  not  be 
controlled for. As a consequence, the component  o ∆  will underestimate the true effect of 
discrimination.  The  implications  of  these  methodological  considerations  is  that  the 
interpretation of  o ∆  should be done cautiously. Although it is formally identical to the ATET, 
the interpretation of the statistic  o ∆  is somewhat different. We are not interpreting this as a 
“causal” effect as for the ATET. The maximum we can do is to interpret  o ∆  as an estimate of 
the importance of factors other than human capital factors (discrimination, social norms) that 
affect gender wage differences. On the other hand  o ∆  is a measure of average wage gap 
between men and women conditional on characteristics X. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
17 Formally, CIA means that the expected counterfactual wage of women is equal to the average observed wage 
of men conditional on X.   27 
6  Estimation results 
 
 
6.1. Differences in the in and out of the common support samples 
 
In this section, we look more precisely at the samples of matched and unmatched 
individuals. We begin with Table 5 which compares the characteristics of the observations in 
and out of the common support. Then, we analyse how wages differ in the unmatched and 
matched samples. 
 
Table 5 shows how the differences between the matched and unmatched individuals in 
terms of some characteristics have behaved in time. For example, among matched individuals, 
the share of individuals with a tertiary education increases steadily in time: it has more than 
doubled from 11.8% in 1996 to 25.3% in 2003. On the contrary, the proportion of high 
educated  individuals  remains  relatively  stable  in  the  unmatched  sample.  We  find  similar 
evidence  for  the  share  of  individuals  with  a  supervisory  function  from  the  year  1997. 
However, the difference is less striking than that obtained for education. An additional proof 
is provided by the share of managers and academicians. In the matched sample, the fraction of 
managers increases steadily from 1.6% in 1996 to 5.2% in 2003 while it has slightly increased 
among unmatched individuals. This is also confirmed by the fraction of academicians which 
has almost doubled over the observation period in the matched sample. Note that from 2000, 
the share of academicians among matched individuals exceeds the one for the unmatched 
individuals.  
 
As a conclusion, the difference between matched and unmatched samples in terms of 
high education and high job position has reduced over time. This is in line with the findings 
from the OFS report (2003) that women have begun to penetrate traditionally male dominated 
areas. However, the concentration of women in these areas is still lower than that of men as it 
is indicated by the higher share of individuals with a good education and a good position in 
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sample In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out
less than 30 years old 34.30 24.40 38.00 24.20 32.80 24.10 28.60 24.10 28.80 22.80 23.60 22.80 25.30 24.50 23.40 25.00
between 30 and 40 years old 31.60 33.10 30.80 33.20 32.00 34.30 35.60 34.10 35.40 33.50 41.60 33.40 33.50 32.20 34.30 31.50
between 40 and 50 years old 20.80 28.60 19.00 28.70 22.20 28.80 22.00 29.40 21.70 30.40 21.80 30.00 24.90 30.30 27.00 30.00
more than 50 years old 13.30 13.90 12.20 14.00 13.00 12.80 13.90 12.40 13.10 13.20 12.90 13.80 16.30 13.00 15.40 13.40
married 47.60 59.80 44.00 58.70 46.20 57.50 46.80 57.70 46.40 56.90 52.90 56.30 52.20 56.30 54.10 54.30
tertiary level of education 11.80 25.30 12.80 25.30 15.10 26.40 15.00 26.70 19.50 26.00 22.40 27.00 22.80 26.70 25.30 29.00
with children under 15 24.90 38.20 23.90 37.50 24.80 37.20 25.10 37.90 25.40 38.10 31.60 38.00 29.60 39.10 31.30 38.20
with responsibility function 33.90 39.40 30.60 41.10 37.50 41.00 40.50 41.20 38.20 40.50 34.70 40.50 39.20 39.30 36.70 41.90
managers 1.60 6.30 2.60 5.90 2.90 7.20 4.50 6.30 4.50 6.20 3.60 5.80 4.50 7.00 5.20 7.40
academicians 11.80 15.80 11.90 15.90 13.00 16.50 12.60 17.50 17.90 16.30 19.20 16.80 20.10 15.20 20.20 16.50
clerical workers 27.60 14.00 26.70 13.50 23.80 14.20 23.00 13.80 17.90 14.60 19.10 13.80 17.00 13.90 16.70 13.80
services 11.00 14.20 11.90 14.90 13.10 14.10 11.00 14.20 11.60 13.20 11.80 14.20 12.30 16.00 12.90 14.90
more than 5 years of experience 88.50 70.80 87.10 74.80 86.90 75.60 88.90 74.20 87.30 75.50 88.10 75.40 89.70 71.50 88.50 70.80
2000 2001 2002 2003 1996 1997 1998 1999
Notes: own computations. 
 
 
In the rest of this section, we analyse the cumulative distribution functions of hourly 
wages for the unmatched and matched samples of men and women.
18 Matched individuals 
refer to individuals on the common support.
19 Figure 1 reports the cumulative distribution 
functions of wages by gender for the years 1996 and 2003. Over the entire period 1996-2003, 
matched  women  earn  more  than  unmatched  women  and  this  holds  over  the  whole  wage 
distribution.  Compared  to  1996,  the  wage  differences  between  matched  women  and 
unmatched women are smaller in 2003, especially at the lower end of the wage distribution. 
However, this does not seem to hold at the upper end of the wage distribution. For men, we 
observe a different pattern: unmatched men earn more than matched men in 1996. There is an 
exception  at  the  lower  part  of  the  wage  distribution  where  differences  seem  to  be  not 
significant. In 2003, matched men earn more than unmatched men, except at the upper part of 
the  wage  distribution.  The  observed  pattern  for  men  can  be  related  to  the  fact  that  the 
distribution of characteristics of women shifts towards that of men over the period 1996-2003. 
Indeed, there is evidence that women are more likely to be high educated or to occupy a 
qualified position in 2003 than in 1996 (see OFS reports, 2003 and 2005).  
                                                 
18 The software package STATA 8.0 was used to obtain all estimates in the paper. The sub-sampling results were 
obtained using TurboMatch 1.0 – a computer program specifically developed to perform the decomposition 
described in this paper. This program shows better performance as compared to a similar STATA routine and 
works  under  Microsoft  Windows  operating  system.  (“Microsoft  Windows”  is  a  registered  trademark  of 
Microsoft Corp.) More information is available from the authors upon request. 
19 It is worth noting that the percentage of matches is between 20% and 40% and is higher for the years 2002 and 
2003 which provide larger samples. This is explained by the fact that it is easier to find an exact match in larger 
samples.   29 












Notes: own computations, hourly wages are in constant 1996 CHF.  
 
 
6.2. Construction of confidence intervals 
 
 
In this section, we describe the procedure used to construct the confidence intervals for 
the mean unexplained gender gap ( o ∆ ). As argued by Abadie and Imbens (2004), we do not 
use  the  bootstrap  technique,  since  it  does  not  provide  asymptotically  valid  confidence 
intervals in case of matching with replacement. In this context, they suggest to use the sub-
sampling variance estimator (see Politis, Romano and Wolff, 1999).
20 Sub-sampling differs 
from bootstrap in the sense that it does not allow for observations to be included into the sub-
sample more than once. The idea of sub-sampling is to draw from the initial sample a certain 
percentage of individuals and apply the matching procedure for this particular sub-sample. 
21 
The implementation of the matching procedure produces the four decomposition components 
for that particular sub-sample. We repeat this sub-sampling procedure a thousand times which 
appears to be large enough to estimate not only variances but also confidence intervals for 
each of the parameters of interest.  
 
                                                 
20 Alternative estimators have been proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2004b) which are valid together with the 
sub-sampling bootstrap variance estimator.  
21 We apply the sub-sampling procedure with the following sample sizes: 25%, 50% and 75%. As expected, the 
“curse of dimensionality” is reinforced in the 25% sub-sampling: the amount of variables on which we match 
remains the same, but the sample size decreases four times compared to the full sample. Results of 25% and 50% 
sub-sampling are not reported in the paper, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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Several points concerning the sub-sampling procedure should be discussed briefly. 
First, we adopt a proportional sub-sampling procedure: we do not sub-sample from the full 
sample of initial size N, because we could have a different number of women and men in each 
sub-sample. In our study, we construct a sub-sample with 75% of women and 75% of men by 
sampling without replacement from the samples of men and women. Second, in the sub-
sampling  procedure,  we  do  care  for  the  weights  of  observations  when  we  draw  random 
samples. Finally, because there is no formal proof that the estimators of the parameters of 
interest are normally distributed, we estimate the bounds empirically from sub-sampling.  
 
The matching procedure applied in this work is based on exact matching. Since the 
counterfactual  wage  is  defined  for  matched  women  only,  it  is  possible  that  the  four 
components of the decomposition may be undefined in small samples. As a consequence, the 
estimates  of  the  standard  errors  and  confidence  intervals  of  the  four  components  will  be 
sensitive to the size of  sub-samples.  In addition, the means of the parameters of interest 
obtained using the full sample could be different from those obtained after sub-sampling. 
Nevertheless, we find that the differences between the mean components of the wage gap 
using  the  full  sample  and  the  mean  components  using  sub-sampling  with  75%  are  not 
statistically significant (see Appendix A.5). This provides some evidence on consistency of 
our  matching  estimator.  Indeed  if  the  estimator  depended  heavily  on  the  number  of 
observations,  our  results  would  have  been  inconsistent.  What  we  observe  is  in  fact  the 
variability in the estimators due to the differences in the sub-sampled individuals and not due 
to  the  differences  in  the  sub-sample  size  (although  the  number  of  matches  declines  as 
expected). As a consequence, the graphs plotting the confidence intervals are using the means 
components obtained after sub-sampling. Concerning the interpretation of the unexplained 
component by some characteristics, we use the means obtained after matching over the full 
sample (see Table 6). 
 
 
6.3. Evolution in time    
 
Using the variables reported in Table 3, we apply the exact matching procedure to 
estimate the gender wage differential in Switzerland for each year of the period 1996-2003. 
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the four components of the wage gap obtained after matching 
together with the 95% confidence area (shadowed area). As expected, the confidence intervals 
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are much narrower in the years 2002 and 2003 due to the significantly larger amount of 
observations present in the dataset for these years. 
 
The first graph refers to  f ∆ , the part of the wage gap that would have disappeared if 
the unmatched women had on average the same wages as their matched counterparts. We 
observe that the variation of this component is rather small over the period of study and it 
stays in the vicinity of 1 CHF. In addition,  f ∆  is statistically significant in almost all years 
(the exception is for 1997). This suggests that ignoring the problem of differences in gender 
supports like it is done in some evaluation studies can result in biases since incomparable 
individuals are compared. In addition, restricting the analysis to the common support only can 
lead to results that are not applicable to the whole population. 
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More intriguing evidence comes from the second graph which refers to  m ∆ , the part of 
the wage gap that would have disappeared if the unmatched men had on average the same 
wages as the matched men. This part steadily declines over the period of study. This indicates 
that  more  and  more  women  obtain  combinations  of  characteristics  that  were  exclusively 
men’s before. Hence, the differences between the matched and unmatched men reduce in time 
and move to zero from the year 2002. The  m ∆  component could be a crude measure of the 
female  disadvantage  in  access  to  particular  combinations  of  characteristics,  which  are 
rewarded on the market. We also find some support for this scenario from Table 3. Over time, 
the distribution of characteristics of women shifts towards that of men (there are more and 
more women with higher levels of education, occupying high qualified job positions such as 
managers, etc.) This increases the chances of women for having the same characteristics as 
men.  Hence,  it  is  less  likely  to  observe  significant  differences  between  matched  and 
unmatched men.  
 
Figure  2  provides  further  support  to  the  latter  scenario.  Indeed,  the  third  graph 
represents,  x ∆ , the component of the wage gap that would have disappeared if the distribution 
of women’s characteristics on the common support was the same as the distribution of men’s 
characteristics on the common support. Figure 2 indicates that this component is steadily 
growing since 1999. This pattern can be interpreted by the fact that although women succeed 
in entering traditionally males’ domains, their concentrations in these areas still differ from 
men’s concentrations. Together with  m ∆  and  f ∆ , this component stands for the explained 
part  of  the  wage  gap.  Since  x ∆   is  higher  than  m ∆   and  f ∆ ,  we  can  conclude  that  the 
differences  in  human  capital  matter  more  in  explaining  the  gender  wage  gap  than  the 
differences in the gender supports, although these latter differences are significant.  
 
Finally  the  fourth  graph  in  Figure  2  shows  the  dynamics  of  the  unexplained 
component of the wage gap  o ∆ . It is statistically significant in all years of study. However, no 
systematic pattern is observed. Instead,  o ∆  fluctuates around about 3 CHF and repeats the 
behaviour observed for the raw wage gap (see Appendix A.6). Such volatility in  o ∆  raises 
some doubts about the fact that it can be attributed solely to discrimination. Indeed, if it would 
be the case,  o ∆  would reflect the change in the employers’ behaviour (employers’ valuation 
of female workers as compared to male workers), hence it should change only gradually.   33 
6.4. Matching vs BO decomposition    
 
 
  In this section, we are interested in how the results from matching decomposition do 
differ from those obtained after BO decomposition. As previously mentioned, the main issue 
with  BO  decomposition  consists  in  ignoring  the  gender  differences  that  can  arise  in  the 
supports. As a consequence, if the linear specification of the wage regression on the common 
support is correct, then we should have similar results to those obtained after matching.
23 
Figure 3 compares the mean effects for the unexplained and explained components of the gap 
obtained  after  applying  BO  without  restricting  to  the  common  support  (called  thereafter 
“unrestricted  BO”),  BO  with  restricting  to  the  common  support  (“restricted  BO”)  and 
matching.  The  left  (resp.  right)  graph  represents  the  results  for  the  unexplained  (resp. 
explained) component of the gap. In both graphs, we plot the confidence intervals for the 
parameters obtained using unrestricted BO.
24 First, Figure 3 provides some evidence on our  
 
Figure 3: Comparing BO and matching decompositions.  
 
Notes: own computations. 
 
expectation that restricting the analysis on the common support will make the results of BO 
closer to those after matching. Indeed, in both graphs, the solid and broken lines are close one 
to each other. In addition, the right graph sheds some light on the importance of the gender 
differences in the supports. Both explained components gap obtained using restricted BO and 
                                                 
23 Note that in the linear specification, we use the same variables as in the matching procedure. In addition, we 
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using matching do not belong to the confidence interval obtained using unrestricted BO. As a 
consequence, differences in supports account for a significant share of the wage gap. This 
result is also illustrated in the left graph of Figure 3. Depending on the year of study, it seems 
that  restriction  to  common  support  in  BO  leads  to  an  over  or  under-estimation  of  the 
unexplained  component  of  the  gap  while  the  extrapolation  assumption  (ignorance  of  the 
common support) always leads to the overestimation of the explained part of the wage gap. 
Finally,  the  similarity  of  the  results  between  the  restricted  BO  and  the  matching 
decompositions indicates that the BO decomposition still provides good results when it is 




6.5. Comparison with propensity score matching 
 
 
  In our matching procedure of Table 4, the conditioning variables are all discrete and 
we are using exact matches: a woman is matched whenever we find an identical man in terms 
of  X.  As  argued  by  Frölich  (2003),  the  exact  matching  procedure  is  very  conservative, 
restrictive and is likely to lead to a non-compact common support, where a “36-year old 
woman and a 38-year old woman are matched while a 37-year old woman is not”. In addition, 
Frölich (2003) shows in a small Monte Carlo analysis that exact matching performs worse 
than  propensity  score  matching.  Since  exact  matching  is  not  often  used  in  the  empirical 
literature, we compare it with the other more commonly used matching algorithms, namely 
the nearest neighbour (NN) and calliper matching algorithms based on the propensity score. 
 
Propensity score is estimated using binomial probit model. In the estimation of the 
propensity score we use the same explanatory variables as in our exact matching procedure. 
The higher is the propensity score, the higher is the estimated probability that a person with 
given characteristics is a woman. To determine the closeness of the control and treated units, 
we use the absolute difference between the propensity scores as a metric. Table 6 reports the 
sample sizes for women and men and the raw wage gap followed by decompositions based on 
different matching algorithms. The components of the decompositions are in CHF for the 
corresponding years. 
                                                                                                                                                         
24 We apply a 75% sub-sampling procedure to construct the confidence intervals for the parameters obtained 
using unrestricted BO. 
25 Note that the distances between the restricted BO and the matching decompositions are due to the parametric 
specification of wage functions in BO decomposition. The effect of applying parametric restrictions is much less 
important in the restricted BO decomposition than in the unrestricted one.    35 
Table 6: Decompositions based on different matching algorithms. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total women 2794 2828 2882 3243 3235 3423 7134 9958
Total men 3069 3107 3169 3439 3311 3381 6958 10880
Raw gap 7.43 5.83 6.79 6.57 5.72 6.40 7.04 6.62
Panel I: Exact matching
∆0 3.55 1.89 2.40 3.49 2.78 2.30 3.66 3.42
∆X 0.92 0.69 1.76 0.81 0.98 1.94 2.42 2.50
∆M 1.63 2.22 1.05 1.24 0.88 0.45 -0.38 -0.39
∆F 1.33 1.04 1.58 1.03 1.07 1.71 1.34 1.09
matched women 697 753 772 895 877 934 2629 3799
matched men 665 720 710 850 838 885 2581 4155
Panel II: Unrestricted Nearest Neighbour matching
∆0 3.50 2.31 4.42 3.72 3.07 2.81 4.05 2.92
∆X 1.74 1.58 0.89 1.94 1.66 2.63 2.60 3.16
∆M 2.19 1.94 1.48 0.91 0.98 0.96 0.39 0.55
∆F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
matched women 2794 2828 2882 3243 3235 3423 7134 9958
matched men 1380 1431 1443 1688 1592 1655 3920 6148
max. distance 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Panel III: Restricted Nearest neighbour matching
∆0 3.87 2.59 4.83 3.66 3.53 2.92 4.44 3.05
∆X 1.18 1.13 0.26 1.66 1.19 2.34 2.03 2.81
∆M 2.16 1.88 1.47 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.36 0.52
∆F 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.02 0.20 0.21 0.24
matched women 2511 2532 2582 2932 2931 3062 6432 8955
matched men 1377 1430 1441 1680 1584 1651 3905 6114
epsilon (x 0.0001) 7.65 7.12 8.04 6.40 7.49 6.75 3.43 2.25
Panel IV: Caliper matching 1
∆0 3.67 2.55 3.77 3.35 3.34 2.99 4.22 2.97
∆X 3.33 2.74 2.64 2.87 1.93 3.20 2.44 3.58
∆M 0.21 0.30 0.14 0.10 0.43 0.02 0.17 -0.18
∆F 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.02 0.20 0.21 0.24
matched women 2511 2532 2582 2932 2931 3062 6432 8955
matched men 2504 2572 2740 2998 2833 2909 6086 9652
epsilon (x 0.0001) 7.65 7.12 8.04 6.40 7.49 6.75 3.43 2.25
Panel V: Caliper matching 2
∆0 3.37 1.88 2.40 3.19 2.65 2.58 3.99 3.27
∆X 0.67 0.50 1.68 0.94 0.88 1.73 2.10 2.35
∆M 1.73 2.40 1.11 1.37 1.12 0.57 -0.39 0.06
∆F 1.66 1.05 1.60 1.06 1.07 1.53 1.33 0.94
matched women 759 819 843 977 949 1029 2890 4421
matched men 730 801 768 923 920 983 2868 4821
epsilon (x 0.0001) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10  
Notes: in CHF current years, “max. distance” refers to the maximum distance between the matches, in 
the  unrestricted  NN-matching;  in  the  restricted  NN-matching  “epsilon”  is  the  maximum  allowed 
distance  a  woman  and  a  man  to  be  matched,  in  the  calliper  matching  “epsilon”  is  the  calliper 
parameter. For the choice of parameters – see text.   36 
  Panel I shows the results of the decomposition based on exact matching. Panel II 
presents the results based on NN-matching. We can note that by construction all women are 
matched and hence the component  f ∆  is zero. It is obvious that these two decompositions 
yield different results. The validity of the NN-matching can be questioned, though. While in 
exact matching we are guaranteed to compare similar (comparable) individuals this is not true 
for the NN-matching algorithm. We use t-test to check if the samples of matched men and 
women are balanced and we find that they are not.
26 One possible explanation to this would 
be  the  presence  of  outliers,  i.e.  the  individuals  which  have  very  rare  combinations  of 
characteristics and thus positioned remotely on the propensity score scale. Indeed we find that 
the  maximum  distance  in  terms  of  propensity  score  between  the  matched  individuals  is 
between one and five percentage points (for different years), which casts doubts about the 
quality of matches. Hence, we have repeated our NN-matching procedure with the restriction 
on the distance between the matches (hence the name “restricted nearest neighbour”). We 
choose as a threshold the 90th percentile of the distribution of the distances between matched 
men  and  matched  women  in  the  unrestricted  NN-matching.  The  results  of  restricted 
NN-matching  are  presented  in  the  panel  III  of  Table  6.  The  number  of  matched  women 
declines by 10% as expected, but the tests show that the samples of matched men and women 
remain  unbalanced.  Thus,  comparison  of  results  of  exact  matching  with  the  results  of 
NN-matching might be inadequate. 
 
Next, we present the results of the decompositions based on the calliper matching (also 
known as radius matching). One of the issues with the calliper matching is the choice of the 
calliper itself. In fact it is impossible to find a value of calliper which would be universally 
accepted  for  all  datasets.  To  determine  the  calliper,  we  first  run  NN-matching  and  then 
compute the distances between the matches (see for instance Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch, 
2004). Knowing these distances provides us information about how big or how small should 
the  calliper  be.  We  choose  as  the  calliper  the  90th  percentile  of  the  distribution  of  the 
distances  between  matched  men  and  matched  women.  This  value  is  reported  as  epsilon 
together with the results of decomposition in the panel IV of Table 6. We repeat the tests for 
these samples of matched men  and women and find that they  are still unbalanced. They 
                                                 
26 The balancing property of propensity score is crucial in the matching procedure based on the propensity score. 
By definition, exact matching on X guarantees that the comparison group is similar to the treated group. When 
using propensity score matching with the propensity score function being preliminarily estimated, we have to 
check that the matches obtained after the algorithm are of good quality. In our paper, we apply the test procedure 
implemented by Sianesi and Leuven (2003) for STATA 8.0 in order to test the balancing property in the calliper 
and nearest neighbour matching procedures.   37 
remain unbalanced when the calliper is set to 0.00005 and it is only when we decrease the 
calliper to 0.00001 that all our matched samples become balanced (see panel V of Table 6).
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  The decompositions in panels I and V of Table 6 are similar but still not identical. As 
expected, the number of matches is higher for calliper matching than in the exact matching.
28 
The differences between the components  0 ,∆ ∆ f  of these two decompositions do not show 
any clear pattern, but they are not as large as in the case of NN-matching. The component  m ∆  
is  systematically  larger  in  calliper  matching  as  compared  to  exact  matching,  while  the 
component  x ∆  is systematically lower (in all but one case). As a consequence, allowing even 
for small differences in the characteristics of matched men and women may significantly 
change the estimated components of the wage gap. 
 
 
6.6. Analysis by some personal characteristics 
 
 
In this section, we analyse the unexplained part of the gender wage gap for some 
specific persons. The analysis focuses on the matched sample only. Hence, we are comparing 
men and women who have the similar characteristics. The upper part of Table 7 indicates the 
absolute and relative gaps by education level. A look at the mean relative gap shows that it is 
among  individuals  with  the  lowest  level  of  education  that  wage  differences  remain  after 
matching. On average, a man with obligatory schooling earns 15% more than his female 
counterpart. The gap reduces to 12% (resp. 10%) for individuals with a secondary (resp. 
tertiary)  level  of  education.  The  lower  part  of  Table  7  shows  the  gender  differences  for 
individuals with specific combinations of age, education level and household composition. 
Type 0 is the base individual aged between 30 and 40, having a secondary level of education 
and having no child under 15. Then, we change the characteristics to see how the gap varies 
across the different types of individuals. Comparing Type 0 with the other types provides 
useful  information  on  how  the  unexplained  gap  is  affected  by  a  particular  variable.  For 
instance, the comparison between Type 0 and respectively Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 permits 
to capture the effect of age.  
 
                                                 
27 The results of calliper matching with epsilon equals to 0.00005 are not presented in Table 6 but are available 
from the authors upon request.   38 
We begin the interpretation of the results by analysing the effect of age. It turns out 
that the differences between the male and female wage structures strengthen as individuals are 
older. For instance, a man older than 50 earns 20% more than the similar woman. On the 
contrary,  wage  differences  between  men  and  women  under  30  are  less  pronounced. 
Comparing  Type  0  and  Type  4  provides  further  light  on  whether  the  presence  of  young 
children in the household increases the wage penalty for women. Indeed, Table 7 indicates 
that the unexplained component of the gap is higher in presence of young children.  
 
Table 7: Unexplained component of the gender wage gap by some characteristics. 
in CHF in % of female wages Obs
By education level
obligatory schooling 2.89 15.33 841
secondary level 2.99 11.61 8512













Type 0: age 30-40, secondary education level, without children under 15
Type 1: age 40-50, secondary education level, without children under 15
Type 2: more than 50, secondary education level, without children under 15
Type 3: under age 30, secondary education level, without children under 15
Type 8: without responsibility function, public sector, large firm
Type 9: without responsibility function, private sector, small firm
Type 4: 30-40, secondary education level, with children under 15
Type 5: 30-40, tertiary education level, without children under 15
Type 6: without responsibility function, private sector, large firm
Type 7: with responsibility function, private sector, large firm
 
Notes: 1996-2003 
29, in constant 1996 CHF. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
28 Notice that in general our exact matching is not the same as radius matching with calliper set to zero, since our 
exact  matching requires all characteristics to be exactly the same,  while radius  matching  with calliper zero 
requires the estimated propensity scores to be the same. 
29 To obtain the population for the period 1996-2003, we pool the samples (obtained after matching) for the 
different years. In other words, we do not match individuals across time.   39 
We  now  turn  to  the  interpretation  of  the  results  by  some  job  characteristics.  We 
combine the following variables: responsibility function, firm size and private/public sector. 
First, the comparison between Type 7 and Type 6 indicates that women with a responsibility 
function are on average more likely to be “hit by discrimination” than women without any 
responsibility function. Second, the comparison between Type 6 and Type 8 seems to indicate 
that at the mean there is no significant difference in the unexplained wage gap between the 
public sector and the private sector. This would be useful to extend the analysis by accounting 
the distributional aspects of the wage gap and to compare the results with those obtained in 
the literature (see for instance Melly, 2005). This extension is left for future work. Lastly, 
Table 7 indicates that women working in small establishments experience a higher level of 
“discrimination” than women working in large firms. 
 
To summarise, the results seem to indicate that even after controlling for observable 
characteristics, significant gender wage differences remain. The analysis of specific persons 
shows that low educated women are more likely to be disadvantaged. Similarly, older women 
face  considerable  “discrimination”.  On  the  contrary,  wage  differences  that  remain  after 
controlling for observable characteristics appear to be much less severe for young women. 
The presence of children exerts an additional wage penalty. Since women with young children 
are more likely to be less educated, this reinforces the fact that education is a key determinant 
of “discrimination”. 
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7  Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, we have investigated gender wage differentials over the period of 1996-
2003. We take into account that the supports of the distributions of characteristics can be 
different. This is an important issue since wage comparisons are relevant only when women 
are  compared  to  “comparable”  men.  In  our  paper,  we  argue  that  gender  differences  in 
supports can be responsible for a substantial part of the wage gap. Indeed, the traditional 
social norms in Switzerland restrict the role of women on the labour market. Typically, men 
have priority on the labour market, while women stay at home and raise children. While this 
gender specialisation in different areas of life has been widely studied in the labour supply 
discussions, it has its own implications for the wage gap story. High selectivity of women in 
some jobs and economic sectors makes it difficult to estimate the counterfactual wages and 
thus to develop public policies aimed at promoting equality between women and men. 
 
To our knowledge, the importance of recognizing the problem of gender differences in 
the supports has not yet been carefully addressed in any Swiss study about gender wage gap. 
The focus of the existing Swiss empirical studies is in disentangling the “explained” and 
“unexplained” components of the wage gap by using the traditional Blinder-Oaxaca (BO) 
decomposition. In our study, we use a matching method to decompose the wage gap. This 
method  has  been  proposed  by  Nopo  (2004)  and  leads  to  a  decomposition  into  four 
components: the traditional “explained” and “unexplained” components (that are now defined 
over  the  common  support  only)  and  two  additional  components  that  account  for  wage 
differences for men and women in and out-of-the common support. This decomposition into 
four components sheds some light on the effect of applying parametric restrictions and on the 
bias which appears when the traditional BO decomposition is applied. For the Swiss data, this 
bias due to the violation of the common support appears to be large and commonly larger for 
earlier years of the study. This implies that the estimation of the wage gap in the early 1990s 
might be not reliable. At the same time, the parametric restriction on the wage function has a 
much smaller effect, indicating that BO decomposition restricted to the common support, still 
remains a powerful tool to decompose the wage gap.  
 
Our results show that over the period of study, the unexplained component remains 
relatively stable. In addition, differences between unmatched and matched women are stable 
over time. On the contrary, differences between matched and unmatched men narrow in time.   41 
This means that women have begun to penetrate traditionally men’s areas. Indeed, the share 
of  women  with  higher  levels  of  education  and  occupying  high  qualified  job  positions 
increases over the period of observation. However, the distribution of female characteristics 
still differs from that of male characteristics even on the common support. This is reflected by 
the  explained  component  of  the  wage  gap  which  is  steadily  increasing  since  1999.  As  a 
consequence, our results show that compared to the mid 1990s, differences in human capital 
nowadays  matter  more  in  explaining  wage  differentials  than  differences  in  the  gender 
supports. Moreover, these latter differences account for a significant part of the wage gap.  
 
The decomposition of the wage gap into four components has a useful interpretation in 
terms of policy implications aimed at reducing the male-female wage differentials. Currently, 
it is recommended to facilitate the access of women to a better education and to particular 
occupations.  However,  this  policy  is  difficult  to  evaluate  using  the  traditional  BO 
decomposition,  since  it only  yields  one  component  of  the  wage  gap  which  is  due  to  the 
differences in characteristics, while the second “unexplained” component is the residual wage 
gap. On the contrary, the four component decomposition applied in this paper allows us to 
measure  the  effect  of  policies  more  precisely.  For  example,  policies  encouraging  the 
combination between family and work would promote women to full-time positions. These 
women will be more likely to be matched and thus the differences between unmatched and 
matched  women  will  decline  (component  f ∆ ).  Similarly,  policies  targeted  to  reduce  the 
barriers for the access to a better education will likely help matched women to reach male 
characteristics (this will affect the component  x ∆ ). As a consequence, we can consider two 
different steps in order to obtain more wage equality between men and women. The first step 
consists in raising the human capital of those women who are currently unmatched to the level 
of the matched women. The second step is to remove dissimilarities between the distributions 
of men and women on the common support. Our analysis shows that these policies should 




Education level of the prime age working population, 1980-2000
Women 1980 1990 2000
obligatory schooling 50.0 36.8 27.0
apprenticeship training 37.8 48.4 45.8
general training 6.0 6.1 11.2
post apprenticeship training 3.5 5.0 7.6
university or technical college degree 2.7 3.7 8.3
Men 1980 1990 2000
obligatory schooling 33.9 24.2 17.0
apprenticeship training 44.9 50.3 45.0
general training 2.9 2.6 6.2
post apprenticeship training 10.3 14.3 18.0
university or technical college degree 8.0 8.5 13.8
Source: Census 1980, 1990 and 2000  
 
Occupation degree in % by gender between 1970 and 2000
year Full-time Part-time Full-time  Part-time
1970 63.1 2.7 24.1 10.1
1980 61.1 2.9 23.5 12.5
1990 57.9 3.1 22.3 16.7
2000 51.3 5.0 21.5 22.3




Job positions by gender in 2001
Women Men
managers, executive employees 3.2   7.5  
scientists and academicians 12.0   19.8  
technicians 24.1   17.3  
administrative personnel 22.1   7.2  
personnel in services and retail trade 20.3   6.8  
farmers 3.5   5.5  
handworkers 4.4   23.7  
operators 1.8   7.4  
manual workers and assistants 8.0   4.2  
Source: OFS report (2003) "Vers l'égalité?"    43 
Appendix A.2
Median gross monthly wage by gender and by sector, 1994-2002
year women men gap* women men gap
1994 3 927 5 153 23.8% 5 376 6 181 13.0%
1996 4 086 5 300 22.9% 5 523 6 250 11.6%
1998 4 253 5 417 21.5% 5 568 6 193 10.1%
2000 4 358 5 551 21.5% 5 672 6 316 10.2%
2002 4 586 5 796 20.9% 5 695 6 377 10.7%
Source: OFS report (2003) "Vers l'égalité?"
Note: the wage is calculated on the basis of 4 and 1/3 working weeks at 40 hours worked per week.
(this allows to convert part-time jobs to full-time equivalent jobs), * gap in % of female wages




Median wages by industry sector in 2002 (private sector only)
Women Men Gap* Share*
Sectors with the lowest wages
personnel services 3 388 4 593 26.2% 74.7%
restaurants, catering 3 508 3 893 9.9% 55.7%
textiles 3 286 5 482 40.1% 77.6%
Sectors with the highest wages
real estate 6 320 8 952 29.4% 42.4%
research and development 6 478 8 504 23.8% 36.8%
banking, insurance 6 067 8 808 31.1% 36.8%
Other economic sectors
construction 5 012 5 361 6.5% 9.9%
trade and repairs 3 864 4 890 21.0% 65.5%
Source: OFS report (2003) "Vers l'égalité?"
Note: the wage is calculated on the basis of 4 and 1/3 working weeks at 40 hours worked per week.
(this allows to convert part-time jobs to full-time equivalent jobs), * gap in % of female wages, and
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Appendix A.3: Explanatory variables used in the analysis
Variables Descritption
Socio-demographics
Age 7 categories: between 15 and 24, between 25 and 29, between 30 and 34,
between 35 and 39, between 40 and 44, between 45 and 49 
and older than 49.
Marital status 4 categories: single, married, divorced and widowed.
Level of education  3 categories: primary (without education, primary school), secondary 
(elementary professional training, apprenticeship, full-time professional 
school, general knowledge school, university entrance qualification),
 tertiary (professional training with master degree, technical and high
 professional school, university, high school).
Foreign citizenship 2 categories: non Swiss and Swiss.
Children 2 categories: with and without children under 15.
Regional characteristics
Region of residence 2 categories: Deutschschweiz (German part) and Westschweiz (Latin part).
Job characteristics
Firm size 3 categories: less than 50 workers, between 50 and 99 workers and 
more than 100 workers.
Supervisory Dummy if supervisory function.
Occupation 8 categories: managers, academicians, technicians, clerical workers, 
services, handworkers, operators and assistants.
Permanent Dummy if permanent work contract.
Public Dummy if job in the public sector.
Work experience 4 categories: less than 6 months, between 6 and 24 months, between 
2 and 5 years and more than 5 years.
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Appendix A4: Means of variables (by rows)
Variables Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Wages in CHF/hour 23.46 30.88 24.10 29.93 23.67 30.46 24.22 30.79 25.53 31.24 25.98 32.39 25.58 32.62 26.52 33.14
Share  44.68 55.32 45.17 54.83 44.97 55.03 45.83 54.17 46.07 53.93 46.71 53.29 47.29 52.71 47.36 52.64
Socio-demographics
Age
15-24 53.85 46.15 54.02 45.98 48.68 51.32 53.23 46.77 52.92 47.08 55.02 44.98 55.89 44.11 52.24 47.76
25-29 43.14 56.86 47.18 52.82 49.25 50.75 51.28 48.72 49.26 50.74 48.64 51.36 48.81 51.19 50.32 49.68
30-34 43.74 56.26 41.86 58.14 40.66 59.34 42.70 57.30 46.69 53.31 48.04 51.96 45.23 54.77 44.72 55.28
35-39 41.05 58.95 43.25 56.75 43.50 56.50 42.79 57.21 42.87 57.13 44.02 55.98 44.21 55.79 45.94 54.06
40-44 41.78 58.22 41.00 59.00 42.91 57.09 42.82 57.18 40.45 59.55 41.30 58.70 45.73 54.27 46.08 53.92
45-49 46.53 53.47 46.12 53.88 44.56 55.44 44.64 55.36 45.58 54.42 46.66 53.34 46.70 53.30 45.93 54.07
50-55 44.86 55.14 44.27 55.73 47.43 52.57 46.34 53.66 47.66 52.34 46.53 53.47 47.12 52.88 48.11 51.89
Marital status
single 46.40 53.60 46.31 53.69 44.64 55.36 47.96 52.04 47.39 52.61 49.30 50.70 47.99 52.01 47.42 52.58
married 39.92 60.08 41.09 58.91 41.84 58.16 41.56 58.44 42.34 57.66 42.22 57.78 44.43 55.57 44.53 55.47
divorced 68.95 31.05 64.24 35.76 64.25 35.75 61.98 38.02 62.07 37.93 63.45 36.55 61.17 38.83 62.60 37.40
widowed 82.26 17.74 78.13 21.87 77.64 22.36 76.18 23.82 63.92 36.08 71.56 28.44 71.02 28.98 79.81 20.19
Level of education 
primary 58.03 41.97 58.33 41.67 55.44 44.56 53.27 46.73 50.28 49.72 54.19 45.81 53.29 46.71 53.09 46.91
secondary 48.34 51.66 48.53 51.47 49.09 50.91 50.50 49.50 51.44 48.56 51.14 48.86 51.97 48.03 52.11 47.89
tertiary 25.34 74.66 26.98 73.02 28.05 71.95 29.17 70.83 30.17 69.83 32.26 67.74 32.75 67.25 34.38 65.62
Foreign citizenship
Swiss 46.42 53.58 46.54 53.46 46.13 53.87 46.90 53.10 47.92 52.08 48.42 51.58 49.13 50.87 49.46 50.54
Foreign 39.09 60.91 40.31 59.69 41.02 58.98 42.28 57.72 39.67 60.33 41.17 58.83 41.40 58.60 40.31 59.69
Children
With children under 15 37.25 62.75 39.09 60.91 39.36 60.64 39.93 60.07 40.26 59.74 41.76 58.24 43.85 56.15 44.97 55.03
Without children under 15 48.74 51.26 48.36 51.64 47.93 52.07 48.98 51.02 49.22 50.78 49.55 50.45 49.20 50.80 48.68 51.32
Regional characteristics
Region of residence*
Notes: own computations; Appendix A4 to be continued
2000 2001 2002 2003 1996 1997 1998 1999
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Variables Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Deutschschweiz 44.01 55.99 44.67 55.33 44.76 55.24 46.01 53.99 46.19 53.81 46.69 53.31 47.61 52.39 47.12 52.88
Westschweiz 46.45 53.55 46.49 53.51 45.56 54.44 45.37 54.63 45.78 54.22 46.77 53.23 46.48 53.52 47.96 52.04
Job characteristics
Firm size
less than 20 workers 48.51 51.49 49.48 50.52 50.48 49.52 50.46 49.54 50.46 49.54 52.36 47.64 52.58 47.42 52.78 47.22
between 20 and 99 workers 38.14 61.86 40.66 59.34 37.62 62.38 40.34 59.66 44.59 55.41 43.57 56.43 44.65 55.35 43.47 56.53
more than 99 workers 41.06 58.94 40.31 59.69 39.66 60.34 40.91 59.09 39.96 60.04 39.38 60.62 40.36 59.64 40.78 59.22
Responsibility function
without 53.52 46.48 54.12 45.88 53.65 46.35 53.92 46.08 55.06 44.94 55.53 44.47 55.50 44.50 56.58 43.42
with  30.39 69.61 30.99 69.01 32.09 67.91 34.20 65.80 32.56 67.44 32.95 67.05 34.58 65.42 33.17 66.83
Occupation
managers 16.48 83.52 19.64 80.36 19.18 80.82 19.82 80.18 24.24 75.76 23.81 76.19 26.72 73.28 28.59 71.41
academicians 29.80 70.20 31.78 68.22 34.96 65.04 32.80 67.20 35.68 64.32 36.58 63.42 35.98 64.02 36.66 63.34
technicians 53.03 46.97 54.27 45.73 51.98 48.02 54.02 45.98 54.66 45.34 54.85 45.15 57.27 42.73 57.07 42.93
clerical workers 66.40 33.60 65.74 34.26 69.98 30.02 71.33 28.67 71.82 28.18 69.86 30.14 70.06 29.94 69.73 30.27
services 72.27 27.73 68.90 31.10 67.60 32.40 69.77 30.23 68.79 31.21 69.95 30.05 68.15 31.85 67.09 32.91
operators 59.26 40.74 57.94 42.06 55.58 44.42 58.33 41.67 55.44 44.56 54.80 45.20 56.87 43.13 60.63 39.37
handworkers 11.76 88.24 9.89 90.11 9.93 90.07 13.62 86.38 11.75 88.25 13.99 86.01 15.22 84.78 15.23 84.77
assistants 18.13 81.87 20.05 79.95 15.18 84.82 17.26 82.74 17.49 82.51 15.19 84.81 14.35 85.65 14.06 85.94
Work type contract
non permanent 50.64 49.36 53.61 46.39 48.84 51.16 49.24 50.76 56.43 43.57 58.75 41.25 57.48 42.52 53.82 46.18
permanent 44.29 55.71 44.71 55.29 44.76 55.24 45.62 54.38 45.44 54.56 45.99 54.01 46.61 53.39 46.92 53.08
Public sector
no 39.09 60.91 38.76 61.24 38.89 61.11 39.27 60.73 38.90 61.10 39.82 60.18 40.40 59.60 40.28 59.72
yes 61.23 38.77 62.81 37.19 62.07 37.93 63.56 36.44 64.57 35.43 64.38 35.62 65.58 34.42 65.53 34.47
Work experience
less than 6 months 61.52 38.48 55.31 44.69 44.25 55.75 71.06 28.94 59.57 40.43 64.08 35.92 66.28 33.72 59.76 40.24
between 6 and 24 months 60.10 39.90 68.26 31.74 58.76 41.24 53.19 46.81 61.45 38.55 65.41 34.59 68.12 31.88 65.51 34.49
between 2 and 5 years 61.73 38.27 56.11 43.89 59.81 40.19 62.46 37.54 60.37 39.63 59.00 41.00 59.83 40.17 60.79 39.21
more than 5 years 40.23 59.77 40.90 59.10 41.36 58.64 41.62 58.38 42.06 57.94 42.75 57.25 42.88 57.12 43.19 56.81
Observations 2794 3069 2828 3107 2882 3169 3243 3439 3235 3311 3423 3381 7134 6958 9958 10880
Notes: own computations
2000 2001 2002 2003 1996 1997 1998 1999
Appendix A4: (… cont.)
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Appendix  A.5:  Differences  between  full  sample  size  means  and  75%  sub-sampling 
means of the corresponding components 
year
1996 -0.58 1.36 -1.25 0.28 -0.88 1.25 -1.06 0.59
1997 -0.15 1.05 -0.78 0.37 -0.79 1.23 -1.35 0.56
1998 -0.34 1.34 -1.17 0.25 -0.83 0.85 -0.57 0.55
1999 -0.26 1.32 -1.46 0.43 -0.91 0.85 -0.49 0.60
2000 -0.60 1.04 -1.41 0.55 -1.47 1.16 -0.56 1.14
2001 -0.25 1.30 -1.20 0.34 -1.18 0.63 -0.66 0.67
2002 -0.10 0.79 -0.74 0.13 -0.45 0.36 -0.35 0.23
2003 -0.24 0.32 -0.28 0.43 -0.44 0.23 -0.18 0.24
year
1996 -0.46 1.20 -1.10 0.19 -0.77 1.05 -0.86 0.51
1997 -0.05 0.94 -0.69 0.29 -0.67 1.06 -1.20 0.40
1998 -0.18 1.20 -1.06 0.15 -0.70 0.69 -0.46 0.49
1999 -0.14 1.24 -1.31 0.30 -0.76 0.73 -0.37 0.53
2000 -0.47 0.92 -1.24 0.40 -1.24 0.95 -0.40 1.04
2001 -0.16 1.23 -1.11 0.25 -1.03 0.49 -0.55 0.56
2002 -0.06 0.71 -0.68 0.06 -0.40 0.29 -0.29 0.21
2003 -0.21 0.28 -0.22 0.39 -0.39 0.19 -0.13 0.20
year
1996 -0.80 1.60 -1.58 0.54 -1.16 1.79 -1.30 0.76
1997 -0.32 1.24 -0.98 0.56 -1.18 1.50 -1.61 0.78
1998 -0.58 1.57 -1.41 0.54 -1.01 1.11 -0.74 0.71
1999 -0.46 1.53 -1.67 0.66 -1.15 1.09 -0.61 0.81
2000 -0.80 1.32 -1.70 0.78 -1.79 1.57 -0.83 1.43
2001 -0.46 1.51 -1.44 0.61 -1.44 1.00 -0.98 0.84
2002 -0.19 0.92 -0.85 0.31 -0.57 0.46 -0.43 0.34
2003 -0.31 0.39 -0.37 0.52 -0.53 0.33 -0.27 0.29
99% Confidence Intervals
∆Μ ∆X ∆0 ∆F
95% Confidence Intervals
∆Μ ∆X ∆0 ∆F
90% Confidence Intervals
∆Μ ∆X ∆0 ∆F
 

















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
year
raw gap unexplained gap
raw and unexplained gender wage gaps
 
Notes: own computations. 
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